Over the coming decades, the cost of U.S. climate change policy likely will be comparable to the total cost of all existing environmental regulation-perhaps 1-2 percent of national income. In order to avoid higher costs, policy efforts should create incentives for firms and individuals to pursue the cheapest climate change mitigation options over time, among all sectors, across national borders, and in the face of significant uncertainty. Well-designed national greenhouse gas mitigation policies can serve as the foundation for global efforts and as an example for emerging and developing countries. We present six key policy design issues that will determine the costs, cost-effectiveness, and distributional impacts of domestic climate policy: program scope, cost containment, offsets, revenues and allowance allocation, competitiveness, and R&D policy. We synthesize the literature on these design features, review the implications for the ongoing policy debate, and identify outstanding research questions that can inform policy development.
climate change provide the opportunity to generate government revenues of the magnitude comparable to other large streams of revenues, such as the corporate income tax. 3 With the potential for such far-reaching effects, it is important to consider several key questions to frame the evaluation of various domestic cap-and-trade or emissions tax proposals.
Will these proposals promote efficiency by addressing climate change in a manner sensitive to costs and benefits? Will these proposals employ cost-effective implementation so that they achieve their stated emission reduction goals as inexpensively as possible? How will these proposals affect the distribution of benefits and costs across the U.S. economy?
The first question-will these proposals promote efficiency by balancing costs and benefits-is the most difficult for economic analysis. The significant uncertainty and long time horizons associated with mitigation benefits challenge underlying assumptions in conventional economic analysis. For example, a standard and sensible condition is that consequences further and further into the future, and/or with smaller and smaller probabilities, should not dominate our analysis. Otherwise, we find ourselves trying to model and forecast events sufficiently rare and/or distant that conventional tools are rendered useless (Weitzman 2007) .
Even keeping the standard assumptions, putting the pieces together for a benefit-cost analysis is daunting. Nordhaus (2007) finds that an optimal global emissions pathway would result in a doubling of CO 2 concentrations. Supporting this conclusion are assumptions about various climate impacts, their valuation in multiple regions around the world, and the choice of discount rate to convert these estimates into present value terms. Yet, having employed benefitcost analysis for the management of a global public good, we are still left with several more challenges in evaluating national policies. First, a global benefit-cost analysis does not provide guideposts on how to divide costs among countries; for example, will developing countries pay according to the same rules as industrialized countries? Second, national policies may involve a more provincial attitude to benefits, where those benefits accruing to other countries are not counted the same; this requires additional information than the global analysis. Finally, regardless of how any single country chooses to answer the first two challenges in developing a national policy, they must confront the fact that every other country will be doing the same 3 Corporate income taxes generate around $350 billion in revenue each year.
thing-creating the potential for strategic behavior by some countries to free-ride on others' actions. 4 Given the difficulties of applying economic analysis to the first question of balancing benefits and costs, we focus our attention primarily on the latter questions of cost effectiveness and distribution. We have identified the following six design issues to inform the consideration of these questions: (1) program coverage and scope; (2) cost containment; (3) use of offsets; (4) revenues and allowance allocation; (5) mechanisms to address competitiveness concerns; and (6) complementary R&D and technology policies. This paper synthesizes the literature on each of these design issues and highlights the implications for building a robust, efficient climate policy that can appropriately address distributional issues identified by policymakers. We draw on the suite of proposals in the 110 th session of the U.S. Congress to emphasize the practical nature and range of these choices (summarized briefly in Figure 2 and Table 1 ). Where relevant, we assess the need for additional analysis and research to better inform policy-making. We conclude by emphasizing the key messages that emerge from the synthesis in light of these design issues.
Program Coverage and Scope
Greenhouse gas emissions occur as a by-product of virtually every form of economic activity. More than 80 percent of U.S. emissions arise from fossil fuel combustion (coal, oil, and natural gas) from an extremely wide range of sources: large power plants and industrial facilities;
homes, businesses, and commercial buildings; agriculture and other small businesses; and automobiles and other modes of transportation. The remaining sources include fugitive emissions of nitrous oxide and methane from agriculture, and industrial releases of fluorinated gases and nitrous oxide (US EPA 2008) . Given this remarkable breadth of the cause of climate change, a cost-effective and efficacious emission mitigation policy should exploit emission abatement opportunities among as many of these sources as possible.
The economic literature has generally supported as broad a single-price policy as possible. This follows from application of Samuelson's (1954) basic result that a public goodor bad, such as GHG emissions-should be priced at its marginal social benefit. Numerous studies have empirically considered how non-price policies lead to much higher costs (Tietenberg 1985) . A ton of CO 2 makes the same contribution to climate change regardless of the location of emissions in the world. For emissions of other GHGs, they will generally have different radiative forcings and different atmospheric lifetimes; however, their global warming potential (GWP) can be converted to "equivalent" CO 2 units (IPCC 2001) .
The issue of non-CO 2 gases is not without controversy, however, as the GWPs are sensitive to assumptions about damages, discounting, and time horizon (Schmalensee 1993 (Clarke et al. 2007 ). Not surprisingly, methane comes up with a very low price in early years.
Returning to the issue of the 80 percent of emissions comprised of fossil fuel related CO 2 , the debate quickly turns to one of where to regulate. Traditional market-based regulation-the U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides programs, the EU ETS, and most recently RGGI and the Alberta emission reduction regime-have focused on large point sources. 5 Such sources have reasonably low monitoring costs and-from a political perspective-are often easier to target for regulation. For traditional pollutants, the focus on smoke-stack emitters reflects the technological opportunities to pursue mitigation efforts through end-of-pipe treatment.
Carbon dioxide is unlike most pollutants because there are no end-of-pipe control technologies -it is the primary product of breaking down hydrocarbon chains. When a fossil fuel is mined, extracted, or imported, we can be relatively confident of the eventual CO 2 emissionsexcepting efforts to sequester the fuel into products (plastics), exportation of fuels before combustion, or the potential for large emissions sources to capture and store CO 2 underground. 6
With the dispersed nature of mobile source and residential emissions, the idea of regulating CO 2 at or near the point of fossil fuel production has received substantial attention (Keeler 2002) .
Such regulation would have modest monitoring costs and would have to cover only about 2,000 to 3,000 facilities in order to control all fossil fuel CO 2 emissions (Stavins 2007; Hall 2007 ).
More recently, many climate change proposals in the Senate have moved in this direction (see Table 1 , where all economy-wide bills are at least partially upstream).
Despite the potential practicality of broad coverage through upstream regulation at or near the point of production, there have been a number of primarily anecdotal concerns (Pizer 2007) . First, some have advanced the concern that producers cannot pass on the cost of allowances or taxes to consumers. In some cases, this reflects existing institutional constraints.
For example, natural gas pipelines tariffs may be regulated in ways that make it difficult for pipeline companies to pass on costs. Market power by the railroads may make it difficult for coal mines to pass through costs to coal users. Despite these concerns, however, most seem surmountable. Second, some have voiced the concern that firms only change their behavior in response to direct regulation, and will not adjust in response to changes in the prices of carbonintensive inputs such as fossil fuels. 7 While there may be some "awareness effect" of forcing end users to think about their fossil fuel use in not just cost but also pollution consequences, the magnitude of this effect would seem to have some practical limits. More importantly, a substantial empirical literature has characterized induced technological change in the U.S.
economy, showing that higher input prices induce firms to invest in factor-conserving technology. For example, industrial firms invested in energy-conserving technologies in response to the energy prices shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, there is often pressure from some sectors that believe their situation warrants special consideration-competition from abroad, vulnerability to price volatility, or security.
The renewed interest in broader, upstream regulation partly reflects concerns about the inefficiency of narrow policy coverage and the difficulty reaching more aggressive targets. First, 6 Capture and storage is impractical for all but large power plants, and currently non-commercial; see Anderson and Newell (2004) for a recent review. 7 The run-up in energy prices in recent years illustrates both pass-through and consumer response to price changes. Higher crude oil prices have translated into higher gasoline prices, and consumption has slowed in response. After annual consumption growth of 1.5 percent for all petroleum products over 1995-2005, U.S. consumption has declined since 2005 (U.S. EIA 2008).
excluding some sources from regulation reduces the set of low-cost abatement opportunities to be exploited. Second, incomplete coverage of the economy's sources may spur emission leakage.
The regulation of large sources may drive economic activity towards smaller sources, e.g., home
use of natural gas and heating oil, instead of electricity. It may also cause unregulated sources to generate power on-site instead of purchasing power from regulated firms. Third, US EPA (2007) shows that under one proposal uncovered sources constitute 20-25 percent of reference case emissions, but they eventually comprise almost half of emissions after imposing regulations on covered sources. Yet, the idea that there would be an eventual broadening of coverage-starting with a few sectors with the aim of expanding to cover other sectors over time-may produce strong, concentrated special interests opposed to such expansion, making it increasingly difficult to further reduce emissions if such sources are not included from the start.
Exactly what is the economic cost of narrow versus broad coverage? There has been considerable numerical analysis focused on this question. Until recently, the vast majority of studies examined the cost savings from broad coverage among countries rather than within countries. In perhaps the most influential study of the former sort, Weyant and Hill (1999) summarized the results of Energy Modeling Forum 16, where modeling teams compared the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol targets unilaterally, with Annex I trading, and with developing country participation. They found that costs were cut by more than half going from autarky to Annex I trading, and at least half again when including developing country participation. Considering a more relevant dimension for the domestic regulatory discussion, EMF-21 considered the effect of including non-CO 2 gases in mitigation policies, and again found costs were roughly cut in half with such broader scope of coverage (Weyant et al. 2006) . 8 This suggests that even though these gases are often a relatively small part of emissions, they are a disproportionably important part of low-cost emission abatement. The same result has been observed in studies of U.S. mitigation costs (EIA 2005) .
Only recently has attention shifted to quantifying the effect of partial coverage of CO 2 emissions within a given country. Pizer et al. (2006) consider both the question of coverage and inefficient policies, examining the consequences of excluding different sources from a cap-andtrade program as well as using policies such as fuel economy standards and renewable portfolio 8 The 2007 Lieberman-Warner bill (S. 2191) voted out of the Environment and Public Works committee would establish a separate refrigerants trading program. Since these comprise a significant share of near-term, low-cost abatement efforts, the parallel markets could reduce cost-effectiveness of the program. standards. They found that limiting the policy to the power and transport sectors-excluding the industrial sector-doubled costs. Using inefficient policies, however, raised costs by a factor of ten. 9 Excluding relatively small sectors-direct emissions from residential and commercial buildings-had a negligible effect. This is consistent with EIA (2007) which similarly found a very small effect of excluding the commercial building sector in a domestic policy. The contrast could be quite stark between legislative proposals for effectively economy-wide caps (e.g., Lieberman-Warner) and proposals for utility-sector-only caps (e.g., Alexander-Lieberman, Table   1 ). Additional analysis could inform the scope of coverage of a domestic climate change policy.
Cost Containment
Any discussion of cost containment should start with the proposition that market-based policies already offer substantial cost reductions over traditional command and control regulation. A rich theoretical and empirical literature supports this proposition (e.g., Stavins 1998 , Carlson et al. 2000 . The discussion then turns to the choice between a quantity instrument (i.e., cap-and-trade program) and a price instrument (i.e., an emissions tax). While this choice may not matter much from an efficiency perspective when abatement costs are well known, that is not likely to be the case with the regulation of GHGs over the next decade as firms and government agencies have little current information on abatement costs.
It is this concern about uncertainty in the costs of implementing a quantity-based climate change program that has spurred consideration of mechanisms to contain climate policy costs. Weitzman (1974) provided the fundamental intuition that when uncertainty exists about costs in a regulated market, the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal benefits will determine preferences for price versus quantity mechanisms. More specifically, relatively flat marginal benefits favors prices; relatively steep marginal benefits favor quantities. 10 Since climate consequences depend on the atmospheric accumulation of GHGs over many decades, the marginal benefits of emission mitigation are relatively flat (Nordhaus 1994; Kolstad 1996) . With annual contributions of about 1/100 th of the accumulated volume (above pre-industrialization levels), these annual contributions cannot cause a dramatic increase in marginal damages. Thus, most economic analyses of policy choice under uncertainty favor prices on efficiency grounds (Pizer 2002; Newell and Pizer 2003 Second, the fixed quantity under cap-and-trade could be relaxed by indexing quantitative caps to economic output. Argentina proposed a national commitment indexed to output in 1999 (Barros and Conte Grand 2002) , and the United States proposed an intensity (emissions-to-GDP) goal in 2002 (EOP 2002) . Several studies have shown that indexing improves on traditional fixed quantity caps in instances where the index is highly correlated with emissions and not too "noisy" (Quirion 2005; Sue Wing et al., in press; Newell and Pizer, in press ). The form of the index-a simple intensity ratio or a more sophisticated function of output-should perform well both under expected economic growth and shocks to output (Aldy 2004) . Nonetheless, price instruments still tend to dominate indexed caps on conventional expected welfare grounds.
11 While banking is frequently allowed under traditional cap-and-trade programs, borrowing is not. Recent Senate bills have proposed various forms of borrowing, including quantitative limits, interest rates, and systemwide versus firm-level provisions. 12 The short-term price smoothing under banking and borrowing is also evident in smoothing prices over longer time horizons, such as promoting dynamic cost-effective attainment of global long-term atmospheric concentration stabilization goals (Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds 1996) .
Third, implementation approaches could include elements of both quantity and price instruments. Roberts and Spence (1976) , Weitzman (1978) , and Yohe (1978) Other proposals have emerged that are more complex than the specification of a particular annual permit supply schedules. Some have advocated for cost containment through a "circuit breaker" that would stop a ramp-down in annual emission caps over time if the allowance price exceeds a specified trigger (Bluestein 2003) . Such a policy effectively sets future permit supply based on past prices, and requires the government to define "allowance price". 14 The proposal for a "Carbon Market Efficiency Board" in the Lieberman-Warner Bill, S. 2191 in the 110 th Congress, illustrates an alternative to specifying the price-quantity trade off in legislation; that is, to delegate authority for managing price and emission uncertainty to an independent board (see S. 2191 in Table 1 ).
Fourth, the basic price-quantity comparison does not fully capture the complexity of adjustment and evolution of the policy over time. As we learn more about climate science, technology costs, policy efficacy, and global participation, we will unquestionably revisit our price/quantity goals. In a world with no transaction costs, government could adjust policy continually to such new information. In reality, it seems likely that the government will make 13 S. 3036, the substitute amendment to S. 2191, includes a price-quantity-price-quantity mechanism that sets a minimum price, a cap (if the minimum price is exceeded), a second price at which additional allowances enter the system (technically borrowed from the future), and then a maximum limit on those additional allowances. See Murray et al. (2008) . 14 The previous policies simply require the government to stand by ready to sell allowances at a fixed price or through a minimum price auction in each period. The circuit breaker requires the government to define a market condition in one period (the average price) and then take a distinct action in the next period (change the target). Could other policy mechanisms dampen short-term price volatility while allowing the market to respond to long-term, fundamental drivers such as climate science, technological progress, and policy development in other countries?
Use of Offsets
While economic theory recommends making a cap-and-trade program as broad as possible in order to seek out the cheapest abatement opportunities, there are many sources that are unlikely to be covered. These include fugitive emissions that are difficult to monitor, particularly from agricultural and forestry activities, and emissions in developing countries. The latter, according to most estimates, offers an enormous mitigation opportunity that could halve the cost of emission targets among industrialized countries (Weyant and Hill 1999 ). Yet, both political and institutional capacity make full-fledged emission trading an unlikely possibility. 15 Project-based offsets potentially offer a means to circumvent the problems of political and institutional capacity by focusing on individual mitigation activities. The theory is simple:
projects that reduce emissions (relative to an agreed-upon baseline) are granted credits equal to the volume of reductions, and these credits may be sold into a cap-and-trade program. Firms regulated by the cap-and-trade program buy these credits and use them to offset some of their emissions. For example, 100 tons of emission reductions under an offset project sold into a capand-trade program effectively increases the emission cap by 100 tons. As long as the project's emission reductions are real, global emissions remain unchanged.
In practice, offset projects are much more complex. The challenge in designing an effective offset program lies in securing real, as opposed to paper, emission reductions. The assessment of real reductions reflects two problems: measuring actual emission levels and identifying an appropriate baseline. With the exception of agriculture and forestry projects, measurement is straightforward-the difficulty is identifying an appropriate baseline. 16 Fundamentally, there is a trade-off. Spending more time and resources on estimating baselines and establishing the degree of real reductions provides greater environmental integrity.
It also raises transaction costs and diminishes the volume of and opportunity for offsets to enter the market. Some have suggested moving away from "ton-for-ton" accounting and instead using offsets to provide incentives for projects with clear climate change and other benefits. Such an approach is particularly appealing when the price is regulated and offsets are limited in their effect on other mitigation efforts. Considerable effort has gone into designing procedures and approaches to strike a balance-for example, two-step registration processes, positive lists of approved project types, and tiered systems with different crediting levels (Hall 2007) . 15 Note that the problem is not only a question of industrialized countries paying for reductions in developing countries-this could be accomplished with a sufficiently generous allocation to developing countries. The problem is that developing countries are unwilling to accept any quantitative limit on their emissions, likely based on concerns about where such a process will lead. Even having such a commitment, it seems unlikely that many developing countries could monitor and enforce a broad domestic cap-and-trade program. 16 See Myers (2007) for a recent discussion of ideas surrounding measurement and baselines for tropical forest activity. The CDM experience points to second important point: the effect of offsets as a subsidy to production. Baumol and Oates (1988) established the principle that while subsidies and taxes create equivalent incentives in a static framework, subsidies lead to dynamic inefficiencies over time by lowering output prices and encouraging excess entry into a market (in order to collect the subsidy). The extent of this dynamic inefficiency reflects the size of the subsidy compared to other production costs. In one very notable case-the destruction of HFC-23, a byproduct of the production of HCFC-22-the subsidy dwarfs the value of the product. Not surprisingly, HFC-23 destruction has constituted 40% of registered and 23% of pipelined projects under the CDM (Wara, 2006) . This, in itself, is not necessarily cause for concern as eligible facilities had to be engaged in production prior to the start of the program. The test, however, will come in the second commitment period: if there is a surge in HCFC-22 production, and opportunities for HFC-23 destruction, will the CDM respond by permitting newer facilities to collect the credit?
What does this suggest? Some project types, particularly those where the subsidy effect is quite large, may need to be dealt with through other mechanisms. This might be a side agreement that is not market-based, or a mechanism that does not credit HFC-23 destruction at its full market value. This need not create an inefficiency: in this case, the market is creating a corner solution where the mitigation is virtually 100 percent. Reducing the offset credit by an appropriate amount will not change that, and will reduce the incentive to expand production. 17
Revenues and Allowance Allocation
Depending on the scope and stringency of a domestic climate change policy, imposing a price on GHG emissions through an emissions tax or cap-and-trade program with an auction could generate $100-300+ billion revenues annually (Paltsev et al. 2007 , Congressional Budget Office 2007 , EIA 2007 . This volume of revenue-almost as much as the $350 billion collected by the corporate income tax-makes the question of what to do with this revenue (or the equivalent volume of allowances) one of the most formidable questions facing federal policymakers. Traditionally for a cap-and-trade approach, the question has been framed as either giving the allowances to regulated emitters at no cost versus auctioning the allowances for general revenue purposes. The policy debate has evolved beyond this simply dichotomy.
Proposals now provide free allocation to a wider range of affected firms (versus only direct emitters), to states, and to funds or quasi-governmental corporations that, in turn, auction allowances to support climate-related activities. At the same time, auction revenues are also being earmarked for a wide range of climate-related activities ranging from adaptation, to technology support, to support for populations adversely affected by the regulation. This blurring of the traditional distinction between free allocation and auctions requires us to re-think how we describe the allocation choices facing policymakers.
This section surveys the impacts such choices can have on the costs borne by various parts of the economy-by industry, electricity generators, low-income households, and by region-as well as on the total costs of a climate change policy. First, we describe how such policies generate so much wealth and when various forms of tax and cap-and-trade policies are equivalent in their distributional impacts. Second, we illustrate the distributional implications of climate change policy and means for addressing distributional objectives. We conclude with a discussion of how using climate policy revenues can lower the total costs and regressivity of climate policy or, alternatively, finance other climate-related policy objectives. 17 A variant of this idea would be to finance these subsidies through an international fund, perhaps itself supported by a credit auction. See, for example, CFR (2008).
A cap-and-trade program effectively rations the right to emit GHG emissions from covered sources in the economy. This rationing, as for any scarce asset, results in a positive price for emission allowances. This price reflects the value for the right to emit a specified unit of GHGs. Summed over the quantity of allowances, this provides an estimate of both the potential revenue to the government as well as the scale of redistribution between those who will end up paying more for fossil energy and those who initially hold the allowances-either the government or someone else. This potential revenue is quite substantial. Paltsev et al. (2007) Regardless of the allocation mechanism (or tax implementation), downstream consumers will generally bear the same energy cost increases under a cap with 100% auction, a cap with 100% free allocation, or a tax set at the expected price of the cap-and-trade approach. 18 In all three cases, the price of the allowance or the tax represents the opportunity cost of emitting another unit of GHG emissions. Even if a business or individual with a compliance obligation receives allowances for free, that business or individual will still consider the price of those allowances in their decision to use fossil fuels and/or price their products. The opportunity to sell unused allowances that are not necessary for firm's compliance, not the initial implicit price of zero the firm faced when acquiring the allowances, will drive firm behavior and pricing 18 A significant exception to this equivalence holds if allowances are granted for free to firms operating as regulated monopolies, such as utilities in cost-of-service jurisdictions , which holds for more than half the U.S. electricity market.
decisions. This effect has been evident in electricity markets in the U.S. under the Acid Rain Program's SO 2 allowance trading regime and in the EU under the CO 2 emission trading scheme (CBO 2007) . Given the relatively inelastic demand for energy, most of the carbon price would be passed on to consumers. Lasky's (2003) survey of various energy-economic models shows that up consumers bear up to 96 percent of the price increases. Figure 1 , for example, shows how the price paid and received for coal varies under various carbon price scenarios in a recent EIA (2008) analysis, with almost all of the burden falling on consumers. Here, supply is almost perfectly elastic while demand falls by 45% in the face of a 300% increase in price. Electricity and many energy-intensive product markets look similar, if not quite as extreme.
The combination of the allocation decision and the incidence of emission pricing primarily on final consumers drive the distribution of climate change policy. A free allowance allocation to businesses in the energy-supply chain-fossil energy extraction, processing, power generation, and energy-intensive businesses-and the transmission of most of the allowance price to final consumers would likely make these businesses better off-as a group-under climate policy than the status quo. 19 This can lead to increasingly regressive household impacts. Parry (2004) finds that the wealthiest quintile of Americans, who own a disproportionate share of capital, enjoy higher disposable income under climate policy, while the poorest 80 percent of the country experience lower disposable income. Metcalf (2007) shows that the lowest decile has 1.8 percent lower disposable income, while the top two deciles have higher disposable income under 100% free allocation. The free allocation benefits wealthy shareholders of businesses receiving those allocations, but the costs of the climate policy are distributed among all consumers of energy-intensive goods, which magnifies the regressivity of the policy since low-income households consume more energy as a share of their income.
An entirely free allowance scheme could also exacerbate geographical inequalities resulting from relative differences in the carbon intensity of household consumption across the country. Aldy (2007) shows that state-level CO 2 emissions per capita vary by a factor of ten. Pizer and Sanchirico (2007) estimate that a $10 per ton price (or tax) on CO 2 would increase household spending by $97 per year in York County, New York, but a much higher $235 per household in Tensas Parish, Louisiana. The disparity across regions reflects important differences in energy use, carbon intensities of electric generation, and electricity regulation. Goulder (2001) has estimated that no more than about 15 percent of emission allowances need to be freely allocated to avoid equity losses in the must vulnerable industries. Free allocations above this level would effectively create windfall profits for those industries, as some have claimed in the pilot phase of the EU ETS. Morgenstern et al. (2007) shows that about a 20 percent perpetual free allocation would keep all manufacturing industries whole. Stavins (2007) estimates that a 50 percent free allocation phased-down to zero over 25 years is equivalent to a 15 percent gratis allocation into perpetuity in present value terms (assuming a real discount rate of 3 percent). NCEP (2007) suggests a similar 50 percent free allocation, declining to zero over time. This suggests that a substantial majority of the emission allowances could be auctioned and used to address concerns about regressivity and efficiency.
The opportunity to generate hundreds of billions of dollars of revenue annually could allow government to lower existing taxes on income, labor, and capital. Reducing distortionary taxes on these goods can promote greater labor participation and capital accumulation. This effective tax swap-increasing the tax (or auctioned allowance price) on GHG emissions and decreasing taxes on labor and capital-could substantially lower the costs of climate change policy. Goulder (2002) shows that a policy reducing GHG emissions 23 percent coupled with a 100 percent auction and optimal revenue recycling could result in half the costs to the U.S. economy of a program with 100 percent free allocation. Policies with allowance prices (or emissions taxes) up to about $15 per ton of CO2 with optimal revenue recycling could result in faster economic growth than no climate policy (Bento and Parry, 2000) . Presumably, the same arguments for optimal recycling would be applicable to revenue used to avoid tax increases.
The government could also direct revenues to address the regressivity of the domestic climate change policy. Metcalf (2007) illustrates how various approaches to returning revenues to the economy can mitigate the regressive impacts of pricing GHG emissions. Specifically, he finds that an "environmental tax credit" applied equally to all workers' payroll tax obligations can offset most of the regressivity of higher costs of energy goods under climate policy, and a modified version that also includes a tax credit to social security recipients can transform the policy to being slightly progressive. Dinan and Rogers (2002) show how the disposable income for the lowest-income quintile could increase some 3.5 to 7.3 percent moving from gratis allocation to an auction with a lump-sum recycling (all households receive the same check).
In the policy world, support has increased in recent years to use the revenues from a climate policy program to benefit various interests, through either earmarking of auction revenue or allocating allowances for particular purposes. For example, some of the allowance auction revenues by states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative have been earmarked for energy efficiency and related demand side management programs. Several bills pending in the U.S. Senate would set aside revenues to aid low-income households and workers adversely affected by climate change policy transition into new positions. Allowances or revenues could also support additional R&D on climate-friendly technologies, such as carbon capture and storage and more research in climate science and adaptation (as specified in both S. 1766 and S. 2191). 20 Little research has addressed how these earmarking approaches would compare on welfare or distributional grounds to recycling revenues through tax rate cuts or tax credits.
Additional analysis can inform the design of policies that can generate substantial revenues and important distributional consequences. First, rigorous analysis should assess the claims of windfall profits during the pilot phase of the EU ETS. This work would provide a valuable empirical basis for the results reported from various simulation models. Second, some in the private sector have questioned the claims that allowance prices or emissions taxes can be so easily passed onto consumers in a world with more international trade and heterogeneity in climate policies among major trade partners. Others have raised questions about price passthrough given current real-world energy market features including long-term contracts, infrastructure regulation, and monopoly / monopsony power in some markets (e.g., rail transport of western coal). A more detailed assessment of how the burden of the policy passes through the fossil energy supply chain would benefit the development of provisions on the point of regulation and allocation. Finally, continued evaluation of efficiency-equity trade-offs in program design, including revenue recycling, free allocations to redistribute burden, and revenue or allowance earmarking, could benefit decision-makers as they craft policy. While the simple distinction between auctions and free allocation has become blurred, the underlying idea that higher fossil energy prices create allowance value that can be used for distinct purposesredistribution, general revenue support, and, most recently, earmarked expenditures-remains the same and raises the same questions. 20 This concept of special interest group allocations is a variation of the idea that free allocations to affected industries will be necessary to buy support for climate change policy (e.g., McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2007) .
Mechanisms to Address Competitiveness Concerns
The design of a domestic GHG emission mitigation policy could adversely affect the competitive position of some U.S. industries, especially those that intensively use fossil fuels and face substantial international competition. Business and labor leaders have expressed concern that increasing the domestic price of energy through climate change policy may create incentives for U.S. facilities to relocate to countries without such policy-related price increases (i.e., developing countries) or to shift production to facilities already operating in these countries. This competitiveness effect-lower industrial employment and production in the United States coupled with higher net imports than would occur with comparable action in all countries-can reflect concentrated costs on those firms participating in a competitive, international market. Understanding the magnitude of this effect is important to inform the design of climate change policy, especially with respect to issues of the scope of regulation, allocation, and obligations imposed on imports from countries without comparable climate policies.
Some recent research shows that only a few, very energy-intensive industries would likely face adverse competitiveness effects of a domestic climate change policy. Ederington et al. (2005) show that U.S. environmental regulatory costs only affect the manufacturing sector's trade with developing countries; the comparability of environmental regulations across the OECD negates any competitiveness effects for U.S. firms with respect to firms in the developed world. Firms in industries with higher transportation costs, larger fixed physical plant share of capital, and those benefiting from agglomeration economies with other firms face less competitiveness pressures as well. Analyses by Morgenstern et al. (2007) , using both simulation models and econometric analyses of the effects of energy prices on competitiveness, illustrate that only the most energy-intensive industries, such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and chemicals, face any kind of economically and statistically meaningful competitiveness threats.
Policymakers could pursue a variety of options to address concerns about competitiveness: coordinating policy efforts with other countries, using allowance allocations and/or exemptions as means to mitigate adverse impacts on industry, and regulations or taxes on imports. The most effective way to ensure that implementing a domestic climate change policy does not result in adverse competitiveness effects on industry and emission leakage is through coordination of policy efforts across countries. If a firm would face the same price for emitting a ton of GHG emissions regardless of its location, then climate change policy no longer creates an incentive to relocate. Pursuit of a broad, cost-effective climate change policy across countries can similarly remedy the competitiveness drawbacks of a domestic program.
Such coordination can be explicit through an international agreement, such as the Kyoto Protocol. For example, large industrial facilities across the EU face the same price for emitting a ton of CO 2 through the cap-and-trade program employed by the EU to implement its Kyoto targets. Such coordination could be implicit, such as through countries developing policies that effectively target the prices faced by their competitors. Pizer (2007) describes how a number of countries have pursued climate change policies independently but have begun to converge on a similar price per ton. Such coordination could reflect prodding by countries taking the lead on climate change policy. The EU has proposed that it will unilaterally go to 20 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2020, but if other major industrial countries follow their lead they will pursue a 30 percent below 1990 goal. The Udall-Petri draft bill in the House of Representatives, as well as the Bingaman-Specter bill in the Senate (S. 1766), calls for a review of developing country actions and policies. If these are not deemed sufficient, then the U.S. cap would not be made more stringent. Additional research on the incentives for countries to follow a credible leader in a multilateral climate change game could further inform these approaches.
The government could also address these concerns through the allocation of emission allowances. Granting free allowances based on historic criteria has the appeal of compensating firms through a wealth transfer without affecting the first-order efficiency associated with equating marginal abatement costs across sources. While gratis allocation does not address the effective price wedge between covered U.S. firms and competitors in countries with no climate policies-so employment and production will fall-it can maintain profits for these firms.
In contrast, granting free allowances based on output or similar measures would affect the price difference between foreign and domestic production, acting essentially as a production subsidy. Traditional analysis in a closed-economy model and/or with industries that do not trade shows that such subsidies are inefficient, as cheaper opportunities to conserve product are forgone in favor of higher cost reductions to reduce emissions per unit of output (Kopp 2007). 21 21 Any approach to gratis allocations maintained over time could be problematic. Updating also could be preferred to historical grandfathering. If free allowances are updated over time based on output, allowances will not be allocated to firms that have shut down as might be the case with grandfathering (though auctioning of allowances would also achieve this). If free allowances are uniformly distributed, firms with relatively lower carbon intense inputs may receive windfall gains.
In models with potential trade distortions arising from some countries adopting GHG regulations while other do not, these subsidies can counteract those effects (Fischer and Fox 2007) .
Finally, exempting some firms from market-based regulation could obviously eliminate the competitiveness effects of climate change policy. Complete exemption from regulation risks increasing the costs of achieving a given emission goal, since exempted firms would then face zero price on their emissions while covered firms would face a positive price. The costs could also increase as the climate policy provides fewer revenues with which to offset existing taxes.
As an alternative, exempted industries might be subject to alternative regulation-although this could worsen the outcome depending on the design. Finally, a less onerous market-based regulation could be applied-either an emissions tax or cap-designed with a reduced burden in mind. For example, the November 2007 revisions to S. 2191 placed refrigerants under a distinct cap designed to reduce the impact of the broader cap-and-trade regime on these products' prices.
The most aggressive policies to address competitiveness concerns would impose a border tax or a regulation based on the emission intensity of imports from countries without comparable climate change policies (Biermann and Brohm 2005) . Imposing a border tax on the carbon content of imports requires very detailed information on the production processes used in manufacturing those imports. Proposals under consideration in several bills in the U.S. Senate would limit the border tax adjustment-a permit-holding requirement-to bulk commodities like cement, rolled steel, etc. for which it is presumably easier to assess carbon content (see Table 1 on the Lieberman-Warner and Bingaman-Specter bills). This proposal would enact the permitholding requirement only after an evaluation of other countries' efforts-deemed to be inadequate in mitigating emissions-several years after the start of the U.S. program.
Designing such a mechanism effectively must confront several questions, some of which could benefit from additional research. First, how will the mechanism deal with the variety of products, product quality, and production techniques, even within the narrowly-defined industries given in the bills? Second, to what extent would the potential of a border tax inspire developing countries to take on new, domestic emission mitigation policies, versus raising the prospects of a trade war? 22 In this vein, for example, it seems unlikely that developing countries would implement costly mitigation policies on their entire domestic economies to protect the 22 See, for example, concerns raised in CFR (2008). small fraction of output destined for the U.S. market. Finally, this mechanism raises key questions regarding compliance with World Trade Organization rules (Pauwelyn 2007) .
Complementary R&D and Technology Policies
An adequate response to the risks posed by climate change will require the development and deployment of new low-carbon and zero-carbon technologies. Policies that impose a price on GHG emissions-such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program-would induce technological change and help move these new technologies into the marketplace. The private incentives to invest in R&D, even in the presence of an emission mitigation policy, will still be weak because of the public good nature of information: creating knowledge through R&D generates benefits that the innovator cannot fully appropriate. A climate-oriented R&D policy should address this market failure to complement mitigation policy. To the extent that current prices, and particularly expectations of future prices, are below the socially desired level, this creates a further argument for climate-oriented R&D. 23 Along the R&D chain from initial idea to commercial product, the incentives for private investment vary. Innovations in basic science tend to suffer from public information problems much more than products and processes at the commercial stage. Government support for basic science can yield quite substantial returns on the investment, especially after accounting for positive spillovers of knowledge creation (Chow and Newell 2004) . Government investment in basic R&D typically does not crowd out private sector R&D. The public policy rationale for commercial and near-commercial technologies-such as through pilot and demonstration projects-is weaker. Private firms have substantial incentive to invest in demonstration projects, and the prospect of public funding for these kinds of projects may crowd out private investment.
Similarly, the rationale for subsidies to encourage the more rapid deployment of already available technologies-for example, subsidies for wind or corn ethanol-is even weaker.
The government could employ an array of models for promoting climate-related R&D.
First, the government has fairly good success in supporting competitive, extramural research through the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, and work undertaken through the country's system of National Laboratories. Second, the National 23 It may be difficult for current governments to create adequate expectations of future prices for a variety of reasons; see Montgomery and Smith (2007) .
Academy of Sciences recently advocated for an agency akin to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency that would focus on innovative energy research (Augustine et al. 2006 ). This socalled ARPA-E would finance extramural research on cross-cutting, transformational science and technology at universities, private sector start-ups, and other research institutions. While the ARPA-E was part of a bill signed into law in 2007, the Bush Administration has indicated no interest in funding the agency (Newell 2007) .
Energy prizes or competitions, similar to the super-efficient refrigerator competition in the early 1990s or the X-Prize for space flight in 2004, could also spur private sector commercialization of basic research. The appeal of a competition is that the government only pays out for proven winners, or more specifically, for outputs, not inputs. The design of competitions can circumvent the problem of "government picking winners" by specifying the characteristics of a winning product without dictating the means of designing the product. Such an approach can engage many research teams as they compete to develop the winning product.
The actual incentive can often be considerably larger than the cash prize, as competitors vie for non-pecuniary benefits such as media attention and prestige (Newell and Wilson 2005) .
So far the discussion has focused on provisions to encourage new technology development; however, climate policies often call for various technology mandates or related performance standards to accelerate deployment of already existing technologies. For example, renewable portfolio standards, biofuel mandates, and efficiency standards would supplement economy-wide cap-and-trade policies in several bills (refer to Table 1 ). Such policy approaches have two important effects on technological deployment, as well as a consequential impact on near-term costs. First and most directly, these mandates accelerate the deployment of existing technologies to ensure compliance with technology and performance standards in targeted industries. At the same time, however, this will tend to lower the allowance price in the emissions market, as the new regulation takes some of the pressure off the cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions. This lower allowance price lowers the incentive for innovation and technological adoption in those industries that are not targeted by the performance standard.
Perhaps most importantly, this combination of performance standards and a cap-andtrade program will tend to increase costs over a cap-and-trade program standing alone with the same environmental outcome. Even as the market-price of allowances falls, this occurs on a base of more expensive reductions required by the technology regulation. In summary, performance standards may increase technological deployment, but in doing so they likely retard technological deployment and improvement in non-targeted industries, and increase the costs of complying with a quantitative cap. For such a policy to be worthwhile, therefore, we must believe that additional deployment in the targeted industries will be enough to offset both foregone innovation in untargeted industries and higher compliance costs in the near term.
While we focused so far on the role of technology policies to supplement emission pricing, the design of the emission pricing policy can also impact innovation and deployment.
Ignoring uncertainty, there have been a number of articles on whether taxes or tradable permits provide more incentive to innovate without any clear-cut result (Milliman and Prince 1989; Fischer et al. 2003) . With uncertainty, however, substantial research in a variety of markets shows that price volatility discourages investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Thus, an emissions tax may deliver more innovation than a cap-and-trade with an expected allowance price equal to the tax. Modifications to the cap-and-trade policy may address this discrepancy, such as through banking and borrowing than can help smooth prices out over time, or cost containment mechanisms such as the safety valve that effectively transforms a cap-and-trade policy to a tax policy at high allowance prices (discussed in section 3). Additional research could explore the potential impacts on private R&D of climate policies that can deliver stable emission prices.
Conclusion
With the recent enthusiasm for domestic climate change policy in the U.S. Congress and in the presidential campaigns of both major political parties, the likelihood of a mandatory GHG mitigation program is increasing. The distribution of the winners and losers and the aggregate costs and benefits of such a policy could vary significantly depending on the policy design. Domestic GHG mitigation policy will have larger and broader impacts over firms and consumers than any existing environmental policy. It could impose costs comparable to all other environmental policies combined, but, in concert with other countries' actions, deliver even greater benefits. Given the scope of the policy problem, interest is high in an efficient, transparent climate policy program to mitigate climate change risks.
We have focused on six key policy elements that any efficacious climate change policy will have to address: program scope and coverage, cost containment, use of offsets, revenues and allowance allocation, mechanisms to address competitiveness, and complementary R&D and technology policies. While identifying the need for more research, a number of points emerge:
(1)
Broader coverage and the inclusion of more emission sources under a single emission pricing policy lowers the cost of any policy goal. Adding sources after a program commences could be increasingly difficult as concentrated special interests evolve to oppose such expansion.
(2) Providing cost certainty can increase the political acceptance of a climate policy, deliver better investment incentives, and facilitate more ambitious long-term emission reduction goals by serving as insurance against unexpectedly high costs. Since any policy will need to adapt to new information on science, technology, and global participation, a key policy feature should allow for temporal flexibility through cost containment measures.
(3) Offsets can be a valuable way to allow access to inexpensive emission reductions that are otherwise outside a mandatory policy; however, there are hurdles that limit their effectiveness and create perverse incentives. This suggests using other policies, in concert with offsets, to address these emissions.
(4) Mitigating GHG emissions will place much of the burden on end-use consumers and involve large revenues. Traditional free allocation to emitters has given way to discussions of more targeted allocations to vulnerable consumers and businesses, earmarked funding for climate-related activities, and general revenues to reduce taxes.
(5) A small set of industries may face serious competitiveness concerns, defined as adverse business impacts related to domestic GHG regulation and the absence of regulation on international competitors. Policy could address these concerns by spurring more coordinated international action, using allocation to compensate and/or to create incentives for domestic production, and creating special import regulations. Unilaterally enacting the latter approach could create problems within the international trade regime.
(6) Policies to promote increased research and development are necessary to complement a market-based climate policy, owing to both the standard R&D market failures as well as the particular difficulties creating long-term policy credibility. The case for such policies are strongest early in the R&D process and weakest for the last step of increasing deployment of existing technologies. Much of the difficulty in basic R&D involves management, while the challenge in later stages revolve around support for R&D inputs (e.g., investment credits) versus R&D outputs (e.g., prizes or production credits).
While there is a tendency to put a premium on getting started as soon as possible, with as strong a policy as possible, these observations suggest some important considerations for getting started with as good a design as possible. Identifying these and/or other fundamental design features should be an important priority for research. New research building on the existing economic literature can inform the design of a robust foundation for long-term domestic climate change policy. Such work can deliver near-term payoffs in the design of a U.S. domestic
program, but also facilitate improvements of other national climate policy programs (e.g., the EU ETS) and guide the design of climate change policies in emerging and developing countries. Unlimited geological sequestration offsets. 5% of allowances set aside to fund biological sequestration and 1% for CCS projects.
Establishes ARPA-E to fund technology advancement projects (24% of auction revenues).
Inaction by developing countries can justify delay in safety valve escalation.
LiebermanMcCain (S. 280)
Economy-wide cap: large downstream at emitter; transport emissions regulated at refinery. (Appr. 75% of emissions covered.)
Discretion of EPA, with guidance for some free allocation and an auction to fund R&D, transition assistance, adaptation measures.
Borrowing: up to 25% of allowances, for no more than 5 years.
Up to 30% of obligation can be met with domestic sequestration projects and international offsets.
Revenues from some auctioned allowances used for RD&D.
Kerry-Snowe (S. 485)
USDA sets rules for domestic biological sequestration. No provisions.
Waxman

SandersBoxer (S.309)
Economy-wide cap: EPA has discretion to implement a market-based allowance program to achieve cap. (Coverage TBD by EPA.) Vehicle emission rules; efficiency & renewable standards for electric generation; additional billspecific mandates.
FeinsteinCarper (S. 317)
85% free to industry, based on generation (updated annually), and phased out by 2036.
Borrowing up to 10%, for no more than 5 years.
International offsets up to 25% of cap; extensive domestic biological offsets.
Distributes auction revenues to multitude of technology programs. 
AlexanderLieberman (S. 1168)
Larson (H.R. 3416)
Economy-wide tax: fossil fuels taxed by CO 2 content at the point of production and import. (Almost 80% of US GHG emissions.)
1/6 of revenues to R&D, 1/12 to industry transition assistance (with phase out), remainder to payroll tax rebates.
$16.5/metric ton CO 2 , rising 10% plus inflation annually.
Tax refunds for domestic sequestration and HFC destruction projects.
1/6 of tax revenues (up to $10B annually) for clean energy technology R&D.
Tax applied to fossil fuel imports; fossil fuel exports are exempt.
